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The decision to engage in business, expand business, or
continue in business by replacing fixed assets is at the same
time a decision to invest funds. Having made these corollary
decisions , the owners or corporate managers are next faced with
the selection of fund sources.
Regarding financial policy, practices and views held by
corporations vary. Even so, basic trends can be seen. In
general, companies prefer to finance from internal sources, but
if they must use external financing, they show a preference for
bonds over common stock. Why, though, do some companies, even
in the same business category, avoid debt while others find it
attractive? One might expect these differences to be based
upon recognized, widely accepted principles. Such a conclusion
2does not seem to be supported by evidence.
Despite the lack of uniformity in corporation financial
practice, it is not difficult to discover authorities who con-
cede the importance of capital structure. According to John
J.B. Cohen and S.M. Robbins , The Financial Manager (New




pp. 578-581, passim .
1

2Childs, capital structure is "the cornerstone of financial
policy." Ezra Solomon, expanding his idea of financial manage-
ment, identified three basic questions requiring defensible
answers by management; one of these was, "How should the funds
required (by the firm) be financed?" The financing of capital
projects has been classified along with the selection of capital
projects as one of the two most important and critical business
decisions, reserved almost always to the judgment of top manage-
ment
.
If, then, capital structure is important to the firm,
requiring the decision of top management, it must be because the
choice of fund source may affect the security, success, and hence
the value of the corporation. The fact that even this basic idea
is not totally agreed upon by scholars of finance provides some
index of the complexity of contemporary literature regarding
capital structure. Considerations such as stockholders' and
debt holders' assessments of risk, their preference or aversion
for risk, and their assessment of future company success based
on varying degrees of knowledge represent a sampling of the
factors which lead to a diversity of opinions among theorists on
capital structure.
John. F. Childs , hong-Term Financing (Englewood Cliffs, N.J,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 7-
Ezra Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1963)
,
p. 8.
^A.J. Merrett and Allen Sykes , The Finance and Analysis of
Capital Projects (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965),
p. xi.

One idea -underlying most theories on capital structure
concerns the cost of capital to the firm. Though there is
certainly little agreement on how this cost should he determined,
there is conceded by many authorities to exist a relationship,
however obscure, between capital cost and capital structure.
Given the variety of conditions that may face a firm seek-
ing capital, one model or simple set of principles seems unlikely
to provide a totally acceptable approach to the problem. It
does appear, however, that the application of mathematical analysis,
coupled with empirical findings, and tempered by the caution of
traditional wisdom may provide a rational avenue to corporate
management for approaching capital structure questions. What is
needed, it seems, are not more mathematical models (though
greater statistical research might be helpful) , but a framework
within which to classify the body of existing knowledge.
A brief case was made earlier for the importance of capital
structure decisions leading to their entrustment to top manage-
ment. These decisions are inherently long-range ones. Even
corporations utilizing no debt have indefinitely long-range
commitments to their stockholders. Failure to admit this would
virtually eliminate the going-concern assumption of accounting
and force a valuation of the firm in question on a liquidation
basis. This long-range commitment inherent in capital
structure decisions requires a system for problem solving that
Friedrich Lutz and Vera Lutz, The Theory of Investment of
the Firm (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951) 5 P- 195
•
Robert N. Anthony, Management Accounting (Homewood, 111.:
Irwin, Inc., 1964-)? p. 33-

4gives proper weight to the varied factors involved. It is the
optimistic goal of this study to extract from existing literature
the more meaningful principles of capital structure development
and place them into a useful context.
The Research Questions
The principal question of this paper is: What are the
factors that should "be considered in determining the capital
source for investment? Subsidiary to the "basic question are:
A. How may the cost of additional capital be determined?
B. What are the effects of dividend policy upon capital
structure?
C. Is there a definable relationship between capital
structure and capital cost?
Limitations
This study is primarily concerned with the quantifiable
aspects of capital structure development as they may be determined
from existing literature and available statistics. The principal
criteria of capital structure management sometimes suggested
are: Flexibility, Control, Cost, and Risk. It is upon the cost
element that this study will be focused. The existence of the
non-quantifiable bases for decisions on corporate finance are
Edward J. Mock, et al . Financial Management: Text,
Problems, and Cases (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Co.,
1968), pp. 254-235.

5recognized, and discussion of these factors will be included
where it complements the central theme.
It is with larger corporations, whose equity and debt enjoy
a ready market, that this study deals, though much of the
material covered applies quite generally. In all cases, the
investment decision is considered to be a given condition as is
the need for funds. The only area of interest is that of source
selection.
Long-term instruments will be the principal concern of the
paper with short-term debt and credit being treated only briefly.
Preferred stocks, convertible issues, and warrants will not be
discussed nor will be the question of public versus private place-
ment of debt.
The orientation of the study is primarily from the view-
point of the owners or corporate managers. Of necessity, some
mention of the analyst's approach, as well as that of the pros-
pective stockholder, will be made but in a summary manner.
Methodology
The method of study used in this paper is based upon
library research. The concepts and factors examined here are
contained in a vast quantity of literature dealing with optimal
financing decisions and written within the last twelve years.
It is intended here to juxtapose the often conflicting, sometimes
redundant models and principles into a coherent framework for
analysis and evaluation of capital structure.

Organization
Chapter II describes the various sources normally employed
by United States corporations in obtaining funds for investment.
The descriptions are general but attempt to define the nature
of these various sources, introducing some of the advantages and
disadvantages which will be explored more fully in Chapters III
and IV.
The basic factors leading to the selection or preference
by corporations of particular fund sources are examined in
Chapter III. Factors examined include determination by the firm
of investors' risk assessment, dispersion of the probability
distributions of the series of profits, the state of financial
markets at the time when financing is needed, the attitudes or
objectives of the particular firm's management and stockholders,
and debt capacity determination.
Chapter IV presents and evaluates the more widely known
analytical models which attempt to express in quantitative terms
the effect of most of the factors of Chapter III upon the value
of the corporation. Within this chapter is discussed the question
of whether capital structure is a determinant of capital cost.






First in any consideration of corporate fund sources is
equity . In a normal sense it is the one indispensable source.
Under circumstances usually encountered, no one will supply all
tho funds required by an enterprise on fixed interest terms, with
the expectation of only a moderate return if all goes well and
possibly nothing if the enterprise fails. For this reason
primarily, the major part of long-term business finance exists in
the form of equity capital. It is bhe nature of these funds that
they are the final claimants to earnings. They can participate
in earnings only after 'all creditors and other suppliers of funds
have received their interest payments in full. Their position
as last claimant makes the equity holders' risks the greatest of
all the forms of capital. In a qualified sense, at least, this
feature of risk makes equity capital the most expensive fund
2
source.
As described above, equity refers specifically to common
stock. If common stock is the most expensive form of financing
as suggested by Merrett and Sykes, why do firms utilize it? The







8basic reason was provided above; equity is the base of the
finance pyramid because other funds cannot normally be attracted
without it. When requiring further funds, newly organized firms
may have no alternative than to employ more equity. The greater
risks and uncertainties attending newer firms, coupled with, their
lack of reputation may make debt capital available only under
2
most unfavorable terms. Older firms, having reached a high ratio
of debt to equity may again encounter excessive interest rates
and/or restrictive conditions attached to debt. An expansion of
the equity base may be an alternative in such instances. Con-
versely, a firm enjoying favor as a speculative issue may take
advantage of a high price to earnings ratio to gain equity capital
at a relatively inexpensive rate.
Two features of equity act to deter corporate managements
from unlimited use of common stock as a fund source. One is
the introduction by new stock of additional voting* shareholders
,
possibly holding views counter to management's or the original
owners. Second, as a deterring factor is the dilution of earnings
which occurs when they are divided among more shares. Such
dilution might reasonably be expected to affect share value c
Though not supported by statistical evidence, the prevalence
Ivan R. Woods, "Financial 'Leverage' and 'Gearing' in
Perspective," in Financial Decision-Making
,
ed. by Edward J. Mock
(Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Co., 1967), p. 527.
2Mock, et al
.
, op. cit .
,
p. 2$7«
Cohen and Robbins , op. ci t.
,
p. 602.
J.R. Lindsay and Arnold 17. Sametz, Financial Management
,
An Analytical Approach (Homewood, 111. : Irwin, 1967) 5 P« 336.

of stock options among corporate managements has been proposed as
creating an immediate aversion of these managements to diluting
, 1issues of new common.
Given that the common shareholder incurs the maximum risk
of iimd suppliers, what then is his gain? The future income of
the owner of shares in a publicly owned corporation has been
2
reduced by Gordon to the following alternatives:
1. Future earnings per share
2. Future dividends per share
3. The future dividends for a finite number of
periods plus the price at the end of that time
Consideration of the shareholders' preferences for dividends now
as opposed to capital appreciation or greater dividends later will
be considered in the following chapter.
Retained Earnings
»
The equity of owners in a corporation is not, of course,
limited to the value of their common stock. It is subject to
increases or decreases through earnings or the pay out of dividends,
respectively. The difference between total earnings to date and
the total amount of dividends to date is retained earnings. J The
retained earnings account is created and developed by transfer of
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the "balance from the revenue and expense summary account.
Retained earnings are shown on the "balance sheet.
Retained earnings deserve and normally receive separate
treatment from common stock in questions regarding finance and
capital structure. Unlike obtaining capital from a new equity
issue, underwriting costs, and other administrative costs and
nuisances are not encountered by management when retained earnings
are employed as a fund source for investment. In fact, the use of
these self-generated funds will not likely raise problems of
2
stockholder consent or of control and interest.
But the reference to retained earnings in the literature
of capital structure and cost of capital frequently is not
restricted to the narrow definition of these funds stated above.
More normally the term, retained earnings, is given a broader
meaning to encompass those funds accounted for under depreciation
or depletion provisions. Depreciation and depletion, though not
earnings are non-cash expenses. Depreciation and depletion
allowances do not constitute net additions to the firm's total
resources. Even so, funds accounted for under these allowances
may permit changes in asset structure through reallocation.
The treatment of internal funds is explicitly noted by some
authors, for instance, Lutz and Lutz who state:
Ralph D. Kennedy and Frederick C. Kurtz, Introduction _ to
Financial and Managerial Accounting (Scranton, Pa.: International










Our definition of the internal supply obviously does
not coincide with what in business parlance has been
referred to as 'retained earnings' after provision
has been made for depreciation (and after dividends
have been paid). We make no attempt here to draw a
dividing line between depreciation and retained
earnings. . .1
The same authors actually used the term internal supply of funds
which they defined as the cash balances plus the total sum for
which all the operating assets (and outside investments) could be
2
sold. Within this paper, retained earnings will be considered
as the annual net earnings less dividends but augmented by
depreciation and depletion allowances.
With the term established, it is apparent that the availa-
bility of retained earnings for reinvestment will be influenced
by the firm's dividend policy. Bodenhorn observes that a firm
could pay dividends equal to the net cash flows generated in any
year. While, he admits, such a policy would result in dissolution
of the firm, he maintains that, in principle, the decision to
reinvest or to distribute to stockholders applies to the total
net cash flow. y Though such extreme decisions as paying dividends
from depreciation allowances are not common, the limited question
of what per cent of profits to pay out is an important, universal
problem of the successful firm. The question is really one of







"'Diran Bodenhorn, "On the Problem of Capital Budgeting,"
The Journal of Finance
,
XIV (December, 1959), ^89.





whether the stockholder is better off to receive dividends or to
reinvest his equity in the firm in expectation of greater dividends
later and/or appreciated value of his stock. What is really in
the stockholders' best interest is usually recognized to depend
upon: the stockholders' tax vulnerability, their preference or
dependence upon an immediate income as opposed to a later one,
and their preference or distaste for the cost and inconvenience
of trading the stock. It is primarily the factor of differential
tax rates that complicates the evaluation of retained earnings as
an investment source. Tax effect varies with stockholders, from
zero for some institutions to a very substantial per cent of
income for certain individuals. It follows that lower income
bracket investors who are dependent on investment income, as well-
as tax-exempt institutional investors would tend to prefer the
cash income of dividends. However rational an approach is used,
some generalizations must be made about stockholders' tax
susceptibility that do not hold for the entire population of
2
stockholders.
The extent of retained earnings use as a capital source is
very significant. In 1961, internal funds accounted for
approximately two-thirds of the total fund sources. More
recently this figure has been quoted as three-fifths of net new




2Merrett and Sykes, op. cit .
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of debt to equity financing over the last several decades has
been due not to common stock issues but to the commensurate
increase of internal funds with debt.
Long-Term Debt
Business firms, unlike consumers, are usually net borrowers;
that is, the funds they require for operation and new investment
normally exceed the funds generated internally as the sum of
2
retained earnings and depreciation allowances. Debt may take
such forms as mortgage bonds, debentures, or long-term notes. It
may, of course, take other forms, most of which fall into the
general category of short term, which will be discussed later.
But in whatever form debt is incurred, it is distinguished from
other fund sources by the obligation it imposes upon the firm to
pay interest and to repay the principal. In contrast, the
common shareholder, regardless of his expectations upon investment,
has no legal claim to dividends or fixed payment. The claims
of creditors to interest and repayment of principal are prior to
claims of the equity holders. The default of this obligation
can place the company in bankruptcy. Firms whose structures
include no debt may exhaust their funds through operating losses
and poor investments, but the owners run no risk of bankruptcy
Lindsay and Sametz, op. cit .
,
p. $ z^/l-.






, op. cit .
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imless some form of debt is incurred. In practice, the legal
possibility of bankruptcy is nearly always present, since a
company will always have at least some accounts payable. As debt
rises, the risk of bankruptcy becomes greater, until a point is
reached where the risk is substantial.
The aspect of risk introduced solely by borrowing has been
the subject of much study. The term financial risk is frequently
used to distinguish it from business risk inherent in the physical
operations of any firm, namely the inability to insure absolutely
stable sales, costs, and profits. Borrowing imposes the obliga-
tions of interest payment and principal repayment, aspects of
financial risk. But additionally, to the extent which borrowing
is used, the fluctuations of annual net cash flow available for
payment of dividends or reinvestment will be greater as a propor-
2tion of the stockholders' investment. In other words, the risk
to stockholders that they will receive neither dividends nor
capital appreciation is increased by borrowing. Barges has
summarized financial risk most succinctly as follows: "The
expected average income for shareholders will be subject to a
greater degree of risk than the income from assets of the firm."
Yet another disadvantage of debt is the loss of flexibility
that may attend its use. Flexibility here is considered to be
Harold Bierman, Jr. and Seymour Smidt , The Capital
Budgeting Decision (New York: The Nacmillan Co. , 1964J ? P- 158.
?
^Alexander Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, Optimal Financing
Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Ea.lT] Inc. , 1965) ?
p. 17.
^Alexander Barges , The Effect of Capital _ Structure on the




management's ability to alter the firm's capital structure when
desirable. " Examples of flexibility loss include rigid require-
ments for sinking fund payments and limitations on dividend
payments; either or both of which may be incurred with bond
2indentures. Compensating balances, which are usually required,
are a further limitation on flexibility, though they are principally
a feature of short- or intermediate-term debt.
With the seemingly formidable disadvantages of debt, why
then is it a major fund source? The opening statement of this
section regarding businesses as net borrowers does not completely
answer the question; presumably, firms faced with capital demand
beyond their internal resources could sell new equity. The
answer lies in the strong, off-setting advantages debt has
vis-a-vis equity, under certain circumstances. The purpose of
raising debt capital is frequently to provide finance on terms
cheaper than those required by equity shareholders. The firm is
actually selling a portion of its income as a prior charge to
the debt holders in return for a capital sum. This sum is usually
secured as a fixed or floating charge on the firm's assets. For
this arrangement to be profitable to the equity shareholders, it
must be that the debt holders are prepared to pay more for this
amount and quality of income than it is worth to the equity
Mock, et al . , op. cit .
,
p. 2J4-.
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shareholders. ' This concept that borrowed capital is cheaper
than equity capital has introduced into business literature the
term "trading on the equity," sometimes referred to as "leverage"
and, less frequently in the United States of America, as "gearing."
These terms may be simply defined as the ability of a business
to obtain low-cost borrowed capital and use it productively to
obtain a higher return with the differential going to the benefit
2
of the owners. The test of the validity of "trading on the
equity" as a concept is basic to theories underlying optimal
capital structures. Table 1 illustrates the effects upon earnings
per share due to financial leverage.
Conditions beyond the firm and its creditors operate to
create a bias in favor of debt. Foremost of these conditions is
the existence of a tax on corporate earnings, favoring debt, in
that interest payments are deductible as an expense. The
advantage is evident for even moderate-sized corporations whose
tax rate approximates 52 per cent. Table 1 on page 17 suggests
the favorable effect of tax law upon interest cost, using a 48
per cent rate. Second is the advantage debt enjoys during periods
of inflation and anticipated inflation. The interest charge of
old debt remains fixed while costs of equity (and new debt) rise.








^Robichek and Myers, op. cit .
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...it seems reasonably certain that if inflation is the
expectation, the potential dollar gains—as well as real
gains—of levered stocks are greater than potential
losses and greater than the potential dollar gains of
unlevered stocks.
1
He goes on to note that inflation and inflationary sentiment have
TJ
3
2been important in the American, economy since 19^-5 • he inflation-
ary situation certainly continues as of this writing.'
Without providing a general theory of capital structure, it
can be shown that certain factors limit the adherents of the
"cheap debt" concept in their use of debt. Availability is an
important limiting factor as is a rising, explicit cost of debt
(interest rate) as more borrowed funds are used. The activities
of the rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service, Standard and
Poor's Corporation and Fitch Investor's Service, affect the debt
servicing cost to be encountered by the borrower. while the
ratings are not exact guides to quality and are not based upon a
mathematical approach, they are widely accepted by investors.
Very recently a spokesman for the Virginia Electric and Power
Company stated that the firm traditionally tried to keep its
percentage of capital from bonds approximately 55 Per cent. He
said, "We can't stray too far off the 55 per cent or we might
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community's evaluation of risks, earnings, and dividends which
theoreticians attempt to quantify, are undoubtedly heavily
influenced by these rating agencies.
Short-Term Debt
Though the foregoing discussion has been oriented toward
debt raised through long-term securities, most of the observations
apply as well to short- and intermediate-term debt. Eli Schwartz
has commented upon finance literature's exclusion of non-security
type debt from capital structure. He states that the exclusion
is arbitrary, that it implies that the borrowers' risk is greater
with fixed debt than with current account, and that it ignores
the substantial interchangeability existing between the various
2forms of external debt. It has been recently acknowledged that
short-term debt's effect on leverage may be the same as that of
long-term debt, although the former's existence is more transitory.
Professor Schwartz's position seems strengthened in view of
the fact that the use of short-term and non-security type debt
has risen abruptly in recent years. As an example, commercial
paper alone reached a volume of $19 billion in May of 1968, "triple
its volume of 1963- The trend has continued with commercial
3
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paper volume reaching $23.7 "billion in March of 1969, approximately
one-third as high as the value of all the nation's prime bank
loans. The interchangeability of debt sources suggested by
Schwartz is explored quantitatively by Robichek and Myers (here-
inafter referred to as KM) , including as alternatives : "
unsecured lines of credit
pledges of accounts receivable
discount forfeitures (stretching of accounts payable)
term loans
The list might equally as well have included trade acceptances
and commercial paper.
Because not all theories or works are so all-embracing as
those of Schwartz or RM, the term capital structure will be
defined, where necessary, as to the funds included.
Summary
This chapter has described the more usual sources of capital
employed by United States corporations; it specifically ignores,
however, preferred stock and convertible issues.
Each of the several sources, common stock, retained earnings,
long-term debt, and short-term debt are found to possess certain
advantages, attended by inherent limitations. Common stock













is determined to be a necessary foundation of the capital
structure. Its use for subsequent expansion is found to be con-
strained by the apparent high cost of this fund source and by
the possible aversion of managements and owners to dilution of
earnings.
Retained earnings, serving to build the equity base of the
structure, are determined to be relatively inexpensive on
superficial examination due to the absence of flotation cost. With
further analysis this source is discovered to have a cost to the
owners through their foregoing of dividends. As a result, the
use of retained earnings is considered to be a function of
dividend policy which in turn is found to be influenced by income
tax, among other things. The term, retained earnings, is defined
to include the non-cash expenses, depreciation and depletion.
In studying debt, it is revealed that this fund source
introduces the hazard of bankruptcy as well as the risk of
interruption of cash flows available for dividends or reinvest-
ment. The concept of financial risk as distinct from business
risk is discussed. The disadvantages of risk are determined to
be offset, partially at least, by the deductibility of interest
expenses from taxable income. The use of debt is considered to
be limited due to its rising explicit cost (interest) with
increased use, its occasionally restricted availability, and its
probable adverse effect upon common share valuation.

CHAPTER III
FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE
SELECTION OF CAPITAL SOURCES
The Objectives of the Firm
Without a common reference against which to measure, it is
not possible to evaluate the various approaches to the fund source
selection problem. Lacking an objective, there is no criterion
by which to measure the effect of proposed courses of action.
Depending upon whose welfare the firm seeks to benefit the optimal
approach may take many forms. An examination of the possibilities
will then be made first.
One of the most categorical statements on objective has been
made by Childs . It is", he says, the owners' or stockholders'
long-run economic benefit that financial managers should seek to
2
maximize. Bierman and Smidt , without defining what should be,
observe that it is a conventionally adopted principle that the
corporation seeks to maximize the economic well-being of its
present stockholders. The two foregoing positions, though very
similar, admit some possibility for conflicting decisions.
James T.S. Porterfield, Investment Decisions and Capital
Costs (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. H-
2Childs, op. cit .
,
p. 4.






Present stockholders may be traders, desiring a quick appreciation
of market value without regard for long-range results. Such
owners might be ill-served by Mr. Child's management concepts.
Both authorities at least agree on maximizing the wealth of
common shareholders, though as a group those owners may have
heterogeneous goals. The definition of what is meant by wealth
maximization is clearly stated by Diran Bodenliorn. He says it is
the difference between the owners ' equity in the firm and their
investment in the firm. More shall be said later of how these
elements are valued. The bases for the wealth maximization
criterion have been summarized rather exhaustively by Port erfield
2
as follows:
(1) The principle proclaimed by Adam Smith that every
individual (in this case firm) , in pursuing its own selfish good,
is led to achieve the best good for all still underlies the
philosophy of the free enterprise economic system.
(2) In many instances, pursuing the welfare of other
publics (community, general public, government) is a means to the
end of maximizing owner's welfare. In other words, differently
stated objectives often clothe the basic objective of wealth
maximization.
(3) Management is responsible to the owners, whose creature
it is. Although in practice the connection between ownership and
control is often a tenuous one, the management that persistently










(4) Even if the firm should decide to pur-sue goals other
than its owners' welfare, it should at least he concerned with how
much this pursuit is costing the owners.
(5) A single explicit objective for the firm is vastly
superior to an ill-defined complex of goals. The latter would
make financial decision-making even more difficult than otherwise.
For the reasons advanced above, as well as for the reason
that most theorists adopt the same objective, it is considered
here that the maximization of wealth for the common stockholder
is the basic, underlying objective of management in decisions
regarding fund sources. In practical applications, however, both
management and investors should be aware that departures from
even this broad objective exist. Corporate managements frequently
have goals that conflict with the economic well-being, short-run
or long-run, of the common shareholders. Examples of interest
conflicts within management include a desire: to see the corporate
organization expand (without regard to stockholder return) ; to
insure that its own tenure and ability to choose its successors is
not threatened; and to extend or at least maintain the realm in
which it is free to make decisions for the organization without
reference to outside groups. A management whose chief aim is
to stay in office may avoid the use of debt solely to insure more
stable earnings and dividends, even though potential profits are
2forfeited in so doing. These considerations may cause
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management to prefer a simple capital structure, even at the
expense of the shareholder in order to minimize challenges to
management's control." Similarly, desire for expansion may lead
management to employ retained earnings for projects less beneficial
to stockholders than would be dividends.
Having accepted the maximization of shareholder wealth as
the principal objective of the firm, substantial further assump-
tions need definition and will be treated in connection with
various theories. These assumptions involve the means of measuring
the shareholders' wealth.
Risk
At this stage, the sources of capital under consideration
may be grouped into two, all-inclusive categories, debt and equity.
The former includes all the various interchangeable forms ranging
from trade credit to bonds; and the latter includes stock, both
common and preferred (the latter will be ignored herein) , and all
internally generated funds.' The reason for the question of choice
betv/een these two sources rests mainly upon the existence of risk.
Under conditions of certainty and perfect markets there is no
difference betv/een debt and equity. The problem of debt as a
2
substitute for equity arises only with the occasion of uncertainty.
The risk problem has two sides. From the standpoint of the
investor, debt offers relatively certain income streams (interest)
because of debt holders ' prior claim on earnings discussed









earlier. For the same reasons, the prospective common stock
investor must view income from equity as less certain. When the
viewpoint is reversed to be that of management, debt and equity
reverse their roles with, regard to risk, i.e., debt is the more
risky. It would seem then that corporate management must consider
its own risk preferences and attempt to anticipate those of
investors. This effort will bring management into what Ross G.
Walker speaks of as "the almost inpenetrable mists of any
2forecast.
"
The classification of risk into business and financial
categories was presented earlier. While business risk appears to
have a definite role in capital structure, this role will be
discussed later. The concern here is with financial risk as a
function of leverage and how this risk is perceived by the
investor. A graphic portrayal of the financial risk concept is
provided by Barges and reproduced below as Figure 1. Curve A
represents the probability distribution of average income from
assets of two firms. The one curve for both firms assumes an
identical distribution and risk class for each firm. Firm A
employs no debt. Curve B, while still identical to A, is shifted
downward, representing debt in firm B's structure. This debt
requires $4,000 servicing cost annually, the magnitude of the
vertical displacement of B. While both curves have the same
absolute range ($10,000), the dispersion relative to expected
v, +- *> x, -i-v, * a ^10,000 10,000nincome is much greater for B than for A ( r V^^ vs. ttw^w^v •° 6,000 10,000
See supra, pp. 14—15 for a discussion of this point.
Ross G. Walker, "The Judgment Factor in Investment Decisions,"
Harvard Business Review, Mar. - Apr., 1961, p Q 99-
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This relatively greater dispersion is due to leverage (use of
debt) and constitutes the financial risk of firm. B. The aspect of


































Figure 1. Effect of debt upon probable income,




EM have described risk aversion in this manner, "A person
is averse to risk in a given situation if, given the choice
between two returns with' the same expected monetary value, he
chooses the alternative with the less risk, risk being defined for
the time being, as some function of the dispersion of the sub-
jective probability distributions of the expected returns."
James C.T. Mao, Quantitative Analysis of Financial Decisions
(London: Collier-Macmil Ian, Ltd c
, 1969) , p. 416.
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These same authors go on to observe that the assumption of risk
aversion is a common one for many writers on capital cost who
agree on little else. As a means of demonstrating the existence
of risk aversion, Eli use the assumption of a utility function.
That is, they assume a mythical Mr. X can consistently express his
preferences as to various values of M, monetary value to be
received in a given year. Assuming his preferences are expressed
"by U = f (M) , where U is utility as a function of monetary value,
a curve could be plotted of utility (on the ordinate) versus
monetary value (on the abcissa) Using the familiar economist's
principle of declining marginal utility, it would be expected
that the curve would have a positive but continually declining
2
slope, i.e., approaching some limiting value of U asymptotically.
With such a curve, the expected change in utility for Mr. X,
given an even bet (the toss of a fair coin) , would always be
negative since the negative possibility would act on the more
steeply sloping portion of the curve than would the positive
possibility. More simply, the monetary value of winning cor-
responds to less incremental utility than does an equal monetary
loss. Even so, the observable fact that some persons gamble often
and all persons gamble sometimes, of necessity, destroys the
universality of the preceeding exercise as a proof of risk
aversion.
Robichek and Myers, op. cit .
,
p. 69-
2Paul A. Samuel son, Economics, An Introductory Analysis









With tlie ambiguity of risk as a concept in mind, it is
possible to identify three broad factors which determine the
riskiness of a stock to an investor: (a) the dispersion of the
subjective probability distribution assigned to expected dividends,
(b) the form of this distribution, and (c) the extent to which
random variations in the dividends are correlated with the
variations in returns of other investment opportunities. The
first two factors exist because an infinite number of probability
distributions may have identical means and standard deviations,
yet be quite different in form. Thus an investor who can ill-
afford loss would choose the investment with the least dispersion
and the least area under the probability curve on the low or
2
negative side. The third factor is exemplified by the alternate
choices of a $1,000 bet on one flip of a fair coin or ten bets of
$100 each on ter> separate flips of a fair coin. It is presumed
the rational, risk-averting investor would choose the latter due to
the probable cancelling effect. Even using these three factors
as guides , it could reasonably be anticipated that investors might
have different expectations regarding the performance of a given
firm. These could vary because: differing quantities and qualities
of information are available to different investors; investors
vary in their evaluation of identical data; investors have unlike
attitudes toward risk; and some investors may expect "irrational"
x











that the expectation of the investor is the question, not an
absolute determination of how the firm will perform.
The risk under review here is exemplified in a simple form
by the application of probabilities. Suppose that an investor is
considering two alternative investments; twenty shares of a stock
or one bond, either investment requiring $1,000 and having a
nominal time range of ten years. The eventualities, as perceived
by the investor, are given in Table 2. An arbitrary 5 per cent
opportunity cost factor is used to discount the income streams
and terminal values to present value. The mean realizations for
both investments are nearly identical (approximately $231). The
most probable realization for the stock, however, is over twice
that of the bond ($4-62 versus $194-)
•>
hut is attended by signifi-
cantly greater risks of absolute loss (4-4- per cent probability
for the stock, 2 per cent probability for the bond). Even in this
simplified situation, the response of the risk averting investor
is not wholly evident. Using the definition of EM given earlier,
though, it is assumed by this writer that the investor would
choose Investment B (the bond) as the dispersion of the outcomes
is far smaller than for the stock. Where a substantial loss
might mean bankruptcy or severe hardship, the likelihood of the
bond being chosen is increased. This does not preclude the
possibility that many investors may place more weight upon the
"most probable outcome," ignoring or demoting the importance of
dispersion and altering the selection to Investment A Q It has
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methods in his risk analysis and "bases his decision principally
upon the most probable value
,
allowing for reductions in that
value by one of several adjustments.
A further obstacle to predicting investor reaction is that
subjective probabilities as employed in the foregoing analysis
are not objectively verifiable. They will vary with different
2persons and even with time. It is not the firm's performance
that management needs to predict in this capital fund source
analysis, but rather the investors' reaction to real or imagined
risks that may be injected into the firm's earnings and/or
dividend streams by increased borrowing.
A useful introduction to possible effects upon common
shareholders' wealth caused by risk evaluation is provided by
Lindsay and Sametz. They propose the idea that when stockholders
feel that the chance of unusual profits or losses is no longer
offset by the higher average return they can receive, they will
view further debt issues unfavorably. In other words, they will
capitalize the probable average earnings at a higher rate to
account for the increased risks of incurring additional fixed
charges and the accompanying increased variability of net
earnings per share of stock. This behavior by stockholders
(current and prospective) would prevent the probable increased
average earnings from increasing the value of the stock in the
marketplace. The idea seems clearly related to the principle of
evaluating dispersions of income discussed on page 26.




Flerrett and Sykes, op. cit .
,
p. 184.






The same writers take yet another approach to highlight the
role of risk through leverage effect on stockholder wealth. In
this approach it is considered that the risk introduced by
"borrowing fund-S is added to the cost of equity funds rather than
to the cost of debt. The latter is then measured only by out-
of-pocket interest cost. This approach, they argue, keeps
uncertainty and risk concerned with dispersion around the most
profitable outcome analytically distinct from the additional
2
risk injected solely by using fixed-charge finance. The
optimal combination of debt and equity will be at the point of
minimal average cost. An example of this method follows and is
summarized in Table J. A company with a capital structure of
equity only has an annual earnings stream of $1,000, capitalized
by the stock market at 10 per cent. Stockholders* wealth is then
$10,000 (assuming 100 shares are outstanding, the per share market
price is $100). The company is faced with a $10,000 investment
opportunity that promises another $1,000 annual returns stream of
exactly the same business risk as the firm's going investment.
If the interest rate at which the firm could borrow the needed
$10,000 were 5 VeT cent, is it advantageous to borrow the funds
or to raise them by selling additional shares of stock?
The solution in this example will be wholly determined by







*Note the conflict with Bodenhorn's definition of owners'
wealth. The two can be nearly reconciled except for considera-
tion of initial investment. (See supra, p. 21.)
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the additional risk injected into the equity earnings stream by
borrowing (raising the Debt/Equity ratio). It is assumed here to
be unlikely that the market will capitalize the $1,500 probable
annual return ($1,000 + $1,000 - $500 interest) at the original
10 per cent. As the authors point out, if the interest rate did
not rise with leverage, debt would be limitless. This ignores
certain other factors, of course, but is adequate for illustra-
tion. The example shows two possibilities, that the capitaliza-
tion rate will rise from 0.10 to either 0.12 or 0.15; that is,
the Price/Earnings ratio will decline from 10 to 8 1/5 or 6 2/5.
TABLE 3
THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL LEVERAGE UPON SHAPE VALUE
Increasing
the Equity Trading on the Equity
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
Expected earnings




Earnings on equity $ 2,000 $ 1,500 $ 1,500
Capitalization rate 0.10 0.12 0.15
Capitalized (market
value of equity) $20,000 $12,500 $10,000
Number of shares 200 100 100
Price per share $ 100 $ 125 $ 100
Source: Lindsay and Sametz, op. cit.
,
p. 296.
In the example, the assumption of a 0.12 capitalization rate
leads to accepting the debt alternative since the market value of
the stock is raised to $125 as opposed to the equity alternative
resulting in a value of $100 per share. The assumption of a
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capitalization rate of 0.15 leaves the problem to be solved by
other factors (possibly non-quantitative) as the stock values for
both the debt and the equity sources are identical. It could be
equally well shown that by assuming a greater capitalization for
the risk of leverage, the advantage could go to the equity option.
In either event, management's problem is to second guess the
market's reaction to increased financial risk.
It is with regard to the effect of risk that a schism exists
in theories regarding capital cost behavior under varying condi-
tions of leverage. The traditionalist view is that although the
Earnings/Price: Interest Ratio is constant, thus providing the
same proportional gain from "borrowing within wide ranges of
Debt/Equity, the risk element increases more than linearly with
rises in the Debt/Equity Ratio.
In later mathematical approaches to the optimal financing
problem, an attempt will be demonstrated of determining a
certainty equivalent of expected dividends «, The concept is that
there exists some factor, a
,
, such that a risk-averting investor
is indifferent between an expected dividend, D
,





The factor a, will have values
0*a,il




Lindsay and Sametz, op. cit .
, .p. 297-





Regardless of the positions taken regarding it, risk is
central to almost all of the principal works dealing with capital
structure. Of those references in the "bibliography of this
study, none which deals specifically with capital structure fails
to identify risk as a factor of such structure.
Stability of Earnings
It follows in a general way that industries which enjoy
inherently stable earnings streams will likewise incur lower dis-
persion of incomes. Based on the discussion of risk aversion in
the preceding section, it would seem reasonable that investors
would find financial risk more acceptable in stable-earnings
firms than in those whose profits are subject to wide and frequent
swings. Such an idea is explicitly stated by at least one
writer. In fact, many authorities mak^: reference to the
stability of earnings as a principal determinant of capital
structure. Lutz and Lutz list this as first among six factors
saying, "In general it will be true that in industries where the
dispersion of expected gross profits is relatively low, there
will be a greater tendency to finance by bonds than in industries
2
where it is high." Eli Schwartz identified the stability of
earnings as part of the external risk of the firm, a term
synonomous with what has hereinbefore been defined as business
risk. Yet another author indirectly supports earnings
Johnson, op. cit .
,
p. 251.
2Lutz and Lutz, op. cit .
,
p. 202.





stability as a major factor by saying that railroads, while
having heavy investments in fixed capital, relative to working
capital, are limited in their use of debt by wide fluctuations in
their earnings. The implication of the foregoing statement is
that debt in the railroad industry, though very high, would be
even higher without the instability of earnings. The regulated
electric utilities best characterize the stable-earnings firms
2discussed here. " Their capital structures typically include
extensive funded debt; until the past decade these firms dominated
the long-term debt market. During the depression years between
1927 and 1933? the earnings of public utilities (excluding
railroads) dropped 10 per cent in contrast to a 68 per cent
4- ...decline for industrials. Early in the 1960s, the public utilities
(not just electrical) as a group had capital structures financed
approximately 30 per cent from long-term debt. Only the construc-
tion and service industries exceeded public utilities in liability
financing, each of the two former, however, with significantly
lower percentages m long-term debt.
The requirement of earnings stability as a prerequisite to
long-term debt may be approached in a different way, namely as
a problem in cash flow management. For example, firms subject
to wide seasonal variations may well find their incomes unable to
Mock, et al
.
, op. cit .
,
p. 238.





^Lindsay and Sametz, op. cit .
,
p. 364.
Reuben F. Slesinger and Asher Isaacs, Business Government ,








meet high fixed debt obligations in all of the four quarters.
Debt, if used by them, must be of a short-term nature. The
retail department stores and manufacturers of toys, fertilizers,
and women's clothes belong to the seasonal income category.
While not eliminated from the long-term debt market, such firms
are characterized by low percentages of long-term debt. In a
similar manner, the durable goods producers, affected strongly
by national income level changes, are subject to longer term
cyclic variations in earnings. Though business cycles affect
the entire economy, the high income elastic products experience
more jeopardy to their earnings in times of recessions than do
the producers of low-cost items or nondurable consumer goods
(foods). The machine tool industry is an example of the extreme
cyclical variation in sales. The nature of the product—
a
durable capital good of relatively high unit value—is such that
it reflects high income elasticity. Companies in this industry
have experienced a series of periods of sharp and prolonged
contractions of income with annual sales reduced to 20 per cent
2
of previous peak years. Not only might these durable goods
firms face possible default, but their borrowed funds may lie
fallow for want of acceptable investment opportunities during
depressed periods. The multiple adverse effects of financial
leverage upon the residual owners creates an aversion to long-




Gordon Donaldson, Corporate Debt Capacity (Boston: Harvard
University, 1961), p. 16.






Of the possible external influences upon capital structure,
regulation is perhaps the most absolute. Furthermore, the
regulated industries include some firms (public utilities) whose
stable earnings characteristics encourage a diverse capital
structure. Those utilities affected by the Securities Exchange
Commission have been influenced by that agency to limit long-
term debt to 50 per cent of their capital structure, in general.
Regulatory bodies have likewise constrained the railroads,
though to a much smaller debt percentage.
Stage in Life Cycle
Previously, under the discussion of equity on page 8, the
effect of firm development was presented as a factor in the
demand for capital and in the selection of source. It is con-
sidered sufficient here to repeat stage of life as a consideration
in capital structure development.
Debt Capacity
While discussing risk as a factor, the point was made that
management must consider the assessment of the investor and
management's own risk preferences in making capital structure
decisions. One aspect of this problem-solving procedure would
seem to be a determination by management of how much debt the




not inconceivable to this writer that the debt decision based,
solely upon an assessment of investor reaction might be on the
dangerous side from the point of view of management. The
rationale for including debt capacity as a factor is predetermined
by the assumption that management seeks to serve the residual
owners' welfare; hence the prudent manager would not needlessly
hazard bankruptcy. But the question encountered is, how to make
explicit the assumptions or feelings of management toward debt.
Gordon Donaldson has proposed a method to be used by cor-
porate mangers in resolving for themselves the question of debt
capacity. His method involves not an evaluation of debt effect
upon corporate value but rather a rational assessment of financial
risk and business risk. He refers to the then current (1962)
practice in management of debt decisions as a relatively "crude
art." Donaldson observed that frequently one of the following
courses was used in reaching a decision on debt capacity:
1. Seeking the counsel of institutional lenders or
financial intermediaries.
2. Taking notice of what comparable companies were
doing in this area of financial management and
following them.
3. Following past practices for the firm.
4. Referring to the obscure authority of "general
practice.
"
Donaldson went on to point out that even the accepted rules for
debt capacity are inadequate. The first of these rules he cited
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as the earnings coverage ratio, "that ratio of net income
available for debt servicing to the total amount of annual interest
plus sinking fund charges." The inadequacy of this criterion,
he noted, is that net earnings on the income statement are not
the same thing as net cash inflow—an assumption implicit in the
earnings coverage standard. As an example, during a recession,
earnings may remain up for a period, but accounts receivable may
experience an incidence of bad accounts far above normal and
hence produce less cash. It is the cash that is needed for the
fixed charges of debt.
As a second inadequate but existing rule, Donaldson listed
the capitalization standard. This standard involves setting the
debt limit at some percentage of the total capitalization. The
limitation of this rule, he said, arises from the wide variation
in relation between the principal of the debt and the annual
obligation for cash payments under the debt contract. In
industrial companies for instance, the principal of the debt may
'be repaid serially over the life of the debt contract, which may
vary from ten years or less to thirty years or more. The annual
cash outflow associated with $10 million debt on the balance
sheet may then, for example, vary from $500,000 (interest only at
5 per cent) to $833,000 (interest plus principal repayable over
thirty years) to $1,500,000 (interest plus principal repayable
3
2
over ten years). Evidence that this measure is still in use is
abundant
.
Gordon Donaldson, "New Framework for Corporate Debt Policy,"
Harvard Business Review
,




*Glenn R. Miller, "Corporate Financing in the Present Money
Market," The Financial Executive
, July, 1968, p. 47.

43
Having exposed the weaknesses of commonly accepted standards,
Donaldson stated his own concept of the basic question in the
determination of the magnitude of risk associated with long-term
debt as: "What are the chances of the business running out of
cash in the foreseeable future?" and "How are these chances
changed by the addition of X,000's of dollars of annual interest
and sinking fund payments?" The steps proposed by him are:
1. Identify the primary factors which produce major
changes in cash flow.
2. Observe the individual behavior of these factors
over time and in particular during recessions
(using company records, if available). The
detailed assessment of key factors is intended to
minimize the inadequacy of historical experience.
The observation of these factors is used to sug-
gest a range of recession behavior which describes
the maximum favorable limit and the maximum
adverse limit. As an example, a review of sales
might suggest a decline as great as 25 per cent
or as little as per cent of normal sales in a
given recession. This then might be thought of
as the range of a normal distribution curve
describing probabilities.
3. Using the above ranges, management, with the aid
of statisticians, may define the most probable





range of "behavior for the key factors and
evaluate cash flov/ "behavior based on these
factors. The residual cash, if any, after
considering outflows is the current debt
capacity expressed in terms of annual flov/
(interest and principal repayment.)
Using the above method, management can produce a debt criterion
stated in terms of the number of dollars of debt servicing that
are acceptable within management's concept of risk bearing at a
given point in time.
Donaldson's method is an approach to what debt the company
can bear. It does not solve the problem of what debt amount
should be employed to minimize capital cost nor does it indicate
whether capital cost varies with debt.
Money and Capital Markets
Prevailing interest rates, stock market performance, and
the economic outlook have a profound effect upon investment fund
sources. As expanded by Keynes, low interest rates generate
greater preference for liquidity, reducing funds available to
would-be investors. Conversely, high interest rates increase
the willingness of money holders to lend but naturally raise
average cost of capital to fund seekers. While the mechanism
2 .
as described here has been challenged as unrealistic, it serves
An extension of Donaldson's method, given the optimal
debt amount based on other considerations, has been developed by
Mao, op. cit
., pp. 454-456.
pJames McN. Stancill, Jr., "The Determination of Corporate
Holdings of Cash and Marketable Securities," in Financial Decision
Making
,




at least as a framework for approach to the interplay of fund
availability and cost. High interest rates need not necessarily
correspond to low stock market prices "but frequently do, as
limited investment is a harbinger of reduced earnings. Frequently,
given a choice, firms will defer investment during such periods,
reducing their capital demand. They may also, drawing upon the
intercbangeability of funds described earlier, utilize the
money market for a period until the capital market becomes less
costly.
In any event, interest rates in the capital market do not
wholly determine the relative desirability of equity versus debt.
As of this writing, fund-seeking firms face a remarkably forbid-
ding combination of circumstances in the capital markets. For
the last eighteen to twenty-four months all fund sources have
2been strained to meet unprecendented demands. Now, with interest
rates at record highs for the twentieth century, firms still
requiring funds are turning to new equity issues. The turn to
equity is not simply because debt charges are high but because
institutional sources are almost exhausted, and some firms hope to
tap the small investor through equity. The glut of these new
issues promises to depress further an already sagging market. y
The determination of source here is made not just on cost but
upon availability.
Samuelson, op. cit .
,
p. 317-










While the effects of the money and capital markets are
not always clear, they unquestionably impinge upon corporate
selection of fund sources. These markets are, furthermore,
somewhat responsive to United States Government manipulation.
Consequently, fund source selection may be said to be at least
indirectly influenced by government policy aside from responses
to tax laws and direct action by regulation.
Summary
This chapter examines a variety of possible factors to test
their influence upon the selection of capital sources. The
objective of the firm is considered first and is accepted out of
necessity in order to have a criterion against which to measure
the effect of proposed courses of action. Largely upon the pre-
dominance of authoritative opinion and the reasoning of Porterfield
the maximization of wealth for the common shareholder is accepted
as the underlying objective of management in decisions regarding
capital fund sources. Conflicts with this basic objective are
recognized to exist in management under certain conditions.
The effect of risk is next examined. This factor is found
to be the principal reason for differentiation between debt and
equity as fund sources. Having previously classified risk into
categories designated business and financial, the latter category
is discussed as a function of leverage. The ultimate determina-
tion of risk to a prospective stockholder is identified as





depending upon the broad factors of: (a) the dispersion of the
subjective probability distribution assigned to expected dividends,
(b) the form of this distribution, and (c) the extent to which
random variations in the dividends are correlated with the
variations in the returns of other investment opportunities.
The inclination of investors to have an aversion to risk is
also investigated. The utility function is used to develop a
strong but not conclusive argument for the risk aversion of
investors. Additionally, the concept of the certainty equivalent
is introduced as a means of establishing an indifference pattern
for investors choosing between sure and uncertain income streams.
Following the examination of risk, earnings stability is
studied and accepted as a significant determinant of capital fund
source selections. The regulated electric utility industry is
chosen to exemplify the high debt capacity of a stable-earnings
firm. Conversely, the capital structures of firms in seasonal
and cyclical industries are reviewed and found to be characterized
by low percentages of long-term debt. This finding is considered
to substantiate further the acceptance of earnings stability as a
capital fund source determinant.
Both regulation and stage in life cycle are surveyed and
found to be important, if not predominant, factors affecting the
choice of debt or equity sources.
Having presented the risk factor from the standpoint of the
investor, risk is next studied in connection with debt capacity.
The approach used is that of Donaldson where a rational assessment
of financial and business risks are made to permit establishment
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by management of realistic debt limits for tlie firm. While the
assessment of all managements is not proven to be rational, it is
suggested that some evaluation by management of the firm's ability
to sustain debt should enter the capital fund source decision.
The final factor introduced is that of market conditions
for money and capital. The varying availability of funds and
terms under which they can be obtained are accepted as certain
determinants of the funding decision.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO THE
EVALUATION OF FUND SOURCE EFFECT
UPON CAPITAL COST
The Traditional Approach
The traditional school of capital structure embraces those
approaches which admit that, even in the absence of corporate
income tax, prudent use of leverage can increase the value of a
business. The basic premise of traditional theory, with proper
assumptions, will lead to a formulation of optimal financing,
i.e., a balanced capital structure where overall cost of capital
is minimized. An elementary form of the traditional approach is
graphically illustrated-- by Figure 2. The average cost of capital
initially decreases (curve pt) as relatively more debt funds are
employed. After a certain point is reached, however, the
average cost of capital again rises as stock and bond yields rise
substantially because of financial risk. The notations, though
not requisite to this example, are introduced here as they will
be used again in examination of this concept.
Implicit in this graphic portrayal is the assumption that
increases in debt reduce the quality of a stock (after a point)






























Ratio of debt to total market value: D/V
Figure 2. Average cost of capital as a function




X = The expected future profits before deduction of
interest
= The market 'value of common shares of the rirm
= The market value of debts of the firm
= The total market value of the firm (S + D)
= The expected rate of return on the common stock
of an unlevered company
X/V" = The average cost of capital to the firm
Writers who accept the principal elements of the traditional
concept are too numerous "uo list. The concept is not uniformly
Representative works include: David Durand, "Costs of Debt
and Equity Funds for Business: Trends and Problems of Measurement,"
Conference on Research in Business Finance (New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1952), pp. 215-24-7; Arthur S. Dewing,
Financial Policy of Corporations (New York: The Ronald Press Co.
,
5th ed., 1953), PP. 437-450.
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expressed by its advocates; their varying assumptions would lead
to a family of curves similar to pt or even curves of sharply
1
varying rates of change. Infinitely many models could be
established, all of which would fit the general statement of
• • 2traditional views. The treatment of the concept by Eli Schwartz
as modified by RM has been found by this writer to be clear and
relatively brief. Though most studies in the traditional form
have dealt exclusively with long-term debt represented by
securities, Schwartz broadened his consideration, as noted
earlier. RM, however, do not explicitly do so in this amplifica-
tion of Schwartz's work presented here.
The treatment is initiated by considering a firm whose
amount of required capital is essentially fixed, for instance, a
new corporation formed to exploit a particular opportunity
requiring investment I . The owners musi: decide the fund sources
for their investment, namely, the portion to obtain from equity
and the portion to obtain via debt. Their own funds invested
will be termed I-p. Debt financing will be represented by I
T
and
interest by i. Total investment then equals I-p + I
T
equals I .
(One determinant assumed here will be the dollar value of expected
dividends relative to stockholders' investment, I-p.) The
constant, expected yearly income before interest will be X (as
in the basic presentation earlier) ; this value v/ill also equal
Barges, op. cit .
,
pp. 11-12.
2Schwartz, op. cit .
,
pp. 18-39? passim .
'A





rl where r Is the internal rate of return on I . With no
o o
reinvestment of earnings, i.e., earnings equal dividends, the
yearly dividend expected by shareholders is a constant, TT
expressed as:
D = X - iIL = hIE
Here the term h is used as the expected dividend return per
dollar of the shareholders' initially contributed capital. The
equation can be expressed explicitly in terms of h in the form:
h ^E + V - ^h
or
IL 2h = r + (r - i) y—
XE
If the spread between r and i is constant, the expression is a
linear function of IT /I^. Should i rise with increasing debt,
h will increase at a decreasing rate. The term h is, in effect,
the cost of equity capital . Where no debt is employed, the term
IT /I becomes zero and h, the cost of capital, equals r, the
internal rate of return on investment.
The treatment above, with capital needs fixed, isolates
the effect of the financing decision upon the dividend return.
Internal rate of return is taken to mean that rate of
discount which equates to zero the present value of the entire
series of cash flows associated with the investment. It is
calculated independently of cost of capital. Mao, op. cit
. ,
p. 193
pThis form will be useful for contrast with conflicting
theory. But note, should an ill-advised management push invest-
ment v/ith borrowed funds to the point where interest rate i
exceeds internal rate of return r, the value of h declines. This
conflicts with reason since equity holders then require less




In reality this is seldom possible as investment and financing
are closely interrelated. There is also the trade off "between
expected returns and financial risk to be considered. This trade
off is ignored in the expressions derived.
To x)Qr"tray the choice between risk and dividend return the
idea of the indifference curve will be used. Such curves will
define the locus of points representing an investor's trade off
positions between h (expected dividend return) and financial







Figure 3- Curves of indifference between
dividend return and financial risk.
Robichek and Myers, op. cit .
,
p. 28.
represents a hypothetical point for a stockholder. He would move
along curve P' with complete indifference, trading off expected
return for risk and conversely. He would not willingly move to
any curve below P' (say P) but would desire to move up to P" if
the opportunity existed. The curves may be considered to define
the share price of a stock. Two stocks offering different com-
binations of risk and expected return might sell at the same price
if so, investors would presumably be indifferent betv/een them.
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Clianging a firm's financial policies and introducing a new com-
bination of risk and expected returns would leave the stock price
unchanged only if the new combination were still to lie on the
same indifference curve. "According to this reasoning, the
market price of the firm's stock is maximized when investors expect
a combination of risk and expected return which is on the highest
possible indifference curve."
To determine the exact optimum point for leverage in the
capital structure, it is necessary to superimpose upon Figure 3
a curve representing h as a function of financial risk I
T
/I-p. The
expression for h derived on page 52 enables this to be done. The
desired point is then defined by the point of tangency of an
investor's indifference curve (representing stock price) to the
curve of h as a function of 1T /1^. The idea is illustrated belowL E
where point A is the optimum point. Positions to the right of A
are ignored as they would conflict with the assumption of risk
aversion.
This approach clearly implies the traditional position,
i.e., at lower levels of debt, stockholders would be willing to
accept greater risk in return for higher expected dividends made
possible by increasing the proportion of debt to equity in the
firm's capital structure. At higher levels of debt, the increased
expected dividends would not offset the greater risk created by
the substitution of debt for equity.
In its original form Schwartz's model was more comprehensive
than that portrayed here in that it demonstrated the effect of





Financial risk = f (IT /IX1 )
Figure 4. Determination of the optimum debt to
equity ratio. Robichek and Myers, op. ci t.
,
p. 30,
varying forms of debt (intermediate, short term and trade credit)
on the cost of capital. His treatment employed a downward
sloping marginal rate of earnings (MRE) concept representing the
incremental rate of return obtained by adding additional assets
to the firm. Imposed upon the MRE function were schedules of
supply for external funds, each schedule relating to a particular
amount of ownership (equity) capital. By dividing the total
profit (areas under the MRE curve for varying amounts of external
capital) by the corresponding equity capital, Schwartz developed
a transformation curve of required rate of return to investors
versus capital stock in the structure. The X axis, increasing
in ownership capital from left to right, describes a decreasing
function of financial risk, i.e., as equity increases, leverage
1decreases While it seems to this writer that Schwartz's





technique would be of questionable practical value due to the
difficulty of defining the marginal rate of earnings function, it
does not appear much easier to define the Wl leverage function.
The latter simplification sacrifices the very important concept
of fund source interchangeability
.
Underlying the approach discussed thus far are a series of
assumptions regarding the factors of capital structure. They
1
are:
1. The individual firm faces risk in the form of
2business risk and financial risk.
2. Business risk is a composite of stability of
earnings and the liquidity, safety, and market-
ability of the assets typically held by the firm.
3. The financial risk of the firm is the risk of its
capital structure.
4-. Business risk is a parameter imposed by the
nature of the industry, though such risk is
known to investors and may affect the optimum
risk carried by the firm.
5. An optimum capital structure for any widely
held company will maximize the long run
value per share of the common stock on the
market
,
given any number of shares .
This example of the traditional approach is a static one,





pSchwartz used the terms external and internal to describe
risk types synonymous with business and financial.
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terms or for change in demand of the firm's products. The
graphical model "by Schwartz did encompass a changing equity base
and identified the rate of return to equity required at any given
leverage ratio. Presumably this ratio could be varied by
reinvestment of earnings, but no equations were developed
specifically identifying the reinvestment effect. The equation
for h, cost of equity capital, developed by RM assumed away the
reinvestment problem and hence, though a useful presentation, is
largely unrealistic. A more general statement of equity cost is
still needed.
The Modigliani-Miller Position
Most of the questions raised in recent years regarding cost
of capital as a function of capital structure were born of the
work by Modiglj ani and Miller (hereinafter called MM) in 1958.
In effect, MM held that the real cost of debt, after accounting
for the increase in equity cost, is the same as the cost of equity,
and that the marginal cost of capital of the firm is equal to
2the average cost of capital.
As a prelude to their work it is helpful to review their
assumptions. They may be summarized this way:
1. Firms can be grouped into homogeneous risk
classes. (Subjective probability distribu-
tions assigned to the firm's expected values
Modigliani and Miller, op. cit
.
,
pp. 261-297, passim ,
2Barges, op. cit .
,
p. 5.





of yearly income, X must be such that all
investors value all firms in the class at
the same rate of return p).
2. The risk to investors depends not only on
the random fluctuations of the expected
income in any period, "but also on the
possibility that the actual value of income
may be different from the investors' best
estimate.
3. All present and prospective investors have
arrived at identical estimates of average
expected income X.
4. Stocks and bonds are assumed to be traded
in perfect markets and individuals can
borrow substantial amounts at the same rate
of interest charged corporations.
5. No taxes are imposed on corporations.
Though not mentioned above, it is important to note that the
expected stream denoted by X is a stream of profits, not dividends
The profits are before deduction of interest and thus equate to
earnings before interest and taxes. It is basic to nil's argu-
ment that, "...as long as management is presumed to be acting in
the best interest of the stockholders, retained earnings can be
regarded as equivalent to a fully subscribed, pre-emptive issue
2
of common stock."




. , p 266.
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Using the assumptions stated, MM go on to develop a math-
ematical proof supporting their Proposition I, which is, "The
average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of
its capital structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of






X. = The expected future profits of Company J in
class k "before deduction of interest
S. = The market value of its common shares
D . = The market value of its debts
3
V . = S . + D . = The total market value of Company J
J J J
p, = The expected rate of return on the common stock
of an unlevered company in risk class k or the
average cost of capital expressed as X./V.
MM support their first proposition further "by an argument
based on arbitrage. They argue negatively that if Proposition I
did not hold, investors could exchange stocks and bonds in such a
way as to exchange one income stream for another, identical in
p
all respects but selling at a lower price. "The general con-
dition for equilibrium to exist is that no two claims to expected







at prices such that the expected, rates of return on the claims
differ . " RM provide a tabular illustration of the arbitrage
principle underlying MM's Proposition I. Two companies are con-
sidered, A and B, the former with all equity financing and valued
at $10,000, the latter with. $4,000 outstanding debt and valued
at $11,000. Each company has the same expected income X = $1,000,
and is in the same risk class.
TABLE 4
EXAMPLE OF A CONDITION INVITING ARBITRAGE
Variable Company A Company B















In the table, i is the stockholders' required rate of return
on equity, S. MM's expression p, = ^ is resolved by RM into:
D • S
V + 1 V
using the relation:
X = rL + iS 2
The term r is Mil's capitalization rate for sure income streams or,
simply interest.











The values of the two companies are not equal because
Company B's stock is overpriced according to Proposition I and
the general condition for equilibrium stated on pages 59 and 60.
Nov/, if a stockholder in B owned 1/100 of the shares of
that company, it would pay him to alter his holdings so as to
cause a downward pressure on the price of B's stock. The share-
holder would sell his shares for $70. He would then borrow $40
so that his personal leverage is the same as that of his old
equity in B (Company B's debt/equity ratio D/S was ^ ? n0Q = rj) •
With the total of $110, he would buy stock in A, enjoying a net
return of $9-4-0 on his new investment (dividends of $11 minus
$1.60 interest charges). This same stockholder earned only $8.40
on his investment in Company B. His risk is identical, according
to KM, as they equate personal leverage to corporate leverage.
Wl go on to derive from Proposition I a second proposition,
shown in Figure 5> concerning the rate of return on common stock
on companies whose capital structure includes some debt.
The term i . is the expected rate of return or yield to equity
J
of a levered company j of risk class k. "The expected yield of a
share of stock is equal to the appropriate capitalization rate
p., for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related
to financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the
2 ...
spread between p-, and r." Again, r represents the capitalization
rate for sure income streams and equates to interest.











= pk + (pk
- r) D/Si
%
Debt to equity ratio: D ./S
.
J J
Figure 5- The behavior of expected yield on
common as a function of debt to equity ratio.
Modigliani and Miller, op. cit .
,
p. 2'75«
Figure 5? above, provides a visual comparison of KM'
s
Proposition II with traditional concepts. The curve ML'G
represents traditional theory where the expected yield is constant
along ML 1 until a certain leverage, L, , is reached, after which
i (and hence p ) rise rapidly with more debt along L'G. The
k
linear segment MO represents Mil's Proposition II wherein r is
constant. Recognizing that economic theory and market experience
both indicate an interest rate rising with leverage, MM suggest
the curve MD as the likely, realistic behavior of i, with leverage
Since i is analogous to the cost of equity capital, Figure 5 niay
be interpreted as indicating a declining cost of equity capital,
after a point, with increasing leverage and interest. This same
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relationship is clear from the intermediate equation used in








obtained by substituting X. = p, (S . + D.) into Proposition I.
2MM contend that the traditional version and that of Durand
(not considered in this study) confuses investors' subjective
risk preferences and their objective market opportunities. Their
Propositions I and II, they say, "...rely merely on the fact that
a given commodity cannot consistently sell at more than one price
in the market; or more precisely that the price of a commodity
representing a 'bundle' of two other commodities cannot be con-
sistently different from the weighted average of the prices of
the two components.' Their Proposition II defines the cost of
equity capital, i. The cost of adding capital, whether equity or
debt, will be the marginal cost of capital equal to p, , the
average cost of capital! If this definition were conclusive and
generally accepted, there would be no need for further study of
the equity cost question. Their Proposition I likewise would
eliminate the optimal corporate structure question by proving





David Durand, "Costs of Debt and Equity Funds for
Business: Trends and Problems of Measurement" in National
Bureau of Economic Research, Conference on Research in Business
Finance (New York, 1952), pp."215-24-7.
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Challenges to the KM Propositions
Alexander Barges, in a doctoral thesis, challenged the MM
position on "both theoretical and empirical grounds. Barges oegan
by asserting that the arbitrage process proposed by MM does depend
for its validity on assumptions as to what constitutes adequate
compensation to investors for assuming a given degree of risk.
The reader will recall the quote of MM given previously claiming
the contrary. Barges supports his assertion by stating that the
risks of personal leverage through margin and the risks of leverage
through the corporation are different. The former, he says, are
unlimited while the latter are not. He furthermore contends that
a significant body of investors do not buy stocks on margin as a
2
result of aversion to the risk of a sudden margin call.
In extension of his theoretical attack, Barges points out
that the equation
i - X - rD
(see page 60), used in deriving Proposition II, contains incon-
5 _
sistent variables. The future earnings, X, are acknowledged as
estimated or uncertain. Interest rate, r, however, is taken as
certain, apparently equal in value to current rates. Barges pro-
poses an alternate expression,

















I = The expected average future interest payments
X = The expected return to common shareholders
c
I = f (present debt retirement schedules, future
management financial policies, future interest
rates, etc.)
If one holds that the above equation is superior to that of MM as
an expression of i, then Barges feels that one of the following
conclusions mast he reached:
(1) Proposition I does not imply Proposition II; or,
(2) The definition of average cost of capital in the
X.
equation ^- = p, is Incorrect; or,
d
(3) The constant, p, , is incorrect; or
(4) A combination of (1), (2), or (3) above
The remainder of Barges ' s theoretical arguments are based oi'
probability analyses and will not be discussed. His challenge
to MM's empirical work lies largely in discovering the use of
the random variable V in the denominator of both the dependent
and the independent variables. This would, under frequently
encountered conditions, result in tests which biased the results
2in favor of M's propositions. To avoid the same bias, Barges
used book values rather than market values for the X variables
in his own empirical work (debt/total equity and senior securities/
common equity). It is important to note, however, that Barges '
s











empirical work did not conclusively discredit MM's findings.
RM have reviewed the work of several authorities who take
issue with MM' s first study. Among the works reviewed "by them
2 3
are those of Boness and Solomon. RM cite general disagreements
on the MM assumptions as follows:
(a) Market imperfections may prevent full operation
of the arbitrage process.
(b) Increasing leverage may force the firm to pass
up profitable investments which an otherwise
identical but unlevered firm would take. (This
statement relates to the earlier discussion of
debt capacity in this study).
(c) Investors may disagree on the risk class of firms.
(d) Investors may, in fact, not be indifferent between
dividends and increased present value of future
dividends
.
RM go on to take exception with Proposition II where the
cost of equity declines with increasing leverage under the con-
6dition of interest rate rising with leverage. By differentiating




A.J. Boness, "A Pedagogic Note on the Cost of Capital,"
Journal of Finance
,
XIX (March, 1964), 99-106, passim .
^Ezra Solomon, "Leverage and the Cost of Capital," Journal
of Finance
,
XVIII (May, 196$), 273-279, passim .













m = marginal rate of interest = r + L
-s-ndD








= rD + iS
and set its derivative equal to zero to determine the point beyond
which i (cost of equity) declines, V and p, "being constant. RM
find that for i to decline as debt is substituted for equity, m
(the marginal interest rate) must "be greater than i (the cost of
equity or expected return to equity)
.
Using the developed relationship of marginal interest rate
and return to equity, RM conclude that m cannot exceed i. If it
were so, they argue, debt holders would demand a greater return on
the incremental debt than would equity holders demand on their
less certain investment. This paradox was unsatisfactorily
explained by MM in the opinion of this writer. Lintner faults
MM on the same point, concluding that Proposition I is incorrect
since, claims Lintner, the expected earnings stream is not
independent of leverage. Proposition II is derived directly
from I and if it is incorrect, II must necessarily be incorrect.
EM do not develop a model or solution procedure to supplant MM's.
Instead they develop what they term a normative framework, tying






John Lintner, "Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices
and the Supply of Capital to Corporations," The Review of
Economics and Statistics
,
XLIV (August, 1962), 269.
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together what is known of the major variables into an approach
to decision making for maximizing the value of equity shares.
John Lintner totally rejects the propositions of Mi. He
first disproves, to his satisfaction, the interchangeability of
dividends and earnings, establishing the former as the determinant
of stock prices. He says, "The 'dividend theory' that prices
are equal to the present values of the cash flow to the investor
remains valid even under fully generalized conditions and should
2be the basis for further theoretical work."" He goes on to con-
clude that, except under fully idealized conditions of certainty,
the earnings yield is a continuously rising, nonlinear function
of corporate leverages at least beyond some initial point. If
Lintner 's statements were accepted, we would be left with one
variant of the traditional concept.
In support of Lintner 's stand on dividends, though not in
direct contravention of MM's theory, Dirhan Bodenhorn has provided
a rationale for rejecting the discounted earnings stream as the
determinant of stock price. Bodenhorn considers a firm with a
net income of $100 in the first year, retaining $50 and paying
$50, and thereby enjoying an income of $105 in future years. He
maintains that the correct present value to the shareholder is
the $50 of the first year (not the $100) plus the discounted
4-
stream of $105 per year for future years. While his argument is
















is persuasive, experience contradicts the dividends approach
since observable stocks, paying no dividends, sell at positive
prices. For this reason alone, Lintner's solutions do not seern
final or all inclusive.
At this point it seems appropriate to return to the
possibility suggested in the introduction that one concise theory
may not suffice to embrace all corporate situations. At least
one authority has noted this circumstance. Professor Van Arsdell
states:
At best, however, a classification of the approaches to
cost-of-capital analysis must be qualified by admission
of over-simplification. Economic theorists are in sub-
stantial disagreement as to the optimal decisions for
capital administration even under assumed conditions of
certainty... Moreover, opinions of economists differ as
to the composition of the capital or investment base, of
the earnings stream and of the discount rate.
2
Van Arsdell goes on to identify four types of income streams that
have received attention in literature dealing with the cost of
capital. These are: net cash flow, net income or net earnings on
common, net income plus bond interest (net operating income), and
cash dividends. He concludes that the analyst must determine
3
which analytical approach best fits the firm under consideration.
The net operating income approach was considered by Wl as
may be confirmed by re-examining their definition of X on page 59
of this study. This approach is characterized by the derivation
of an overall rate for cost of capital without first solving for
Robichek and Myers, op. cit .
,
p. 61.








the cost of debt capital and the cost of equity capital separately.
For instance, Mi first determine p, from X/V. The separate value
i, for equity cost, is derived from the overall expression. The
cost of debt is taken by MM as the effective interest rate, as
noted earlier.
Cost of Capital
The concept of an optimal capital structure is only signifi-
cant as a means of minimizing to the firm its cost of capital,
disregarding for the moment the significant nonquantitative
aspects covered in Chapter III. There is little argument that the
cost of capital to a firm at a given point in time is the weighted
2
average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt. Ignoring
the many qualifying statements introduced already in this chapter,
such an average could conceivably be determined by using
E = Exp e cted Earnings = Cost Qf Eguity and current interest rate
a iiarK!e"c mce
demanded by creditors = cost of debt. Then (ACC) Average Cost of
Capital = M^t
Eq
value \T1 + ^ p^" (i). Thus expressed, the ACC is
completely general depending upon how E and i are determined. To
a
satisfy the Bodenhorn school, E can be assumed for illustrationu
' a
here to be all paid out in dividends (expected). Having computed
the ACC at a point in time, and being faced with a need for funds,
the question arises of which fund source to employ to cause the
least incremental increase in ACC. This incremental increase




2Lindsay and Sametz, op. cit . ," p. 321.
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capital (MCC). It is the cost we seek to minimize by proper
fund source selection. After all, the question of this study
does not contemplate dissolution of the firm, hence the existing
capital structure is taken as given, subject to intelligent
retirement of debt or refunding. If MM were to be followed, the
ACC would equal the MCC, being unaltered by choice of debt or
equity sources.
Since the question here is not one of hurdle rate for
investment, but rather, one of investment source, cost of capital
formulas based upon static conditions do not suffice to predict
the MCC unless the simplifying assumptions required to justify
the formulas are realistic. If such were the case, formulas
provided by many writers, such as Mao, could be used for deter-
. . . . 2
mining the existing cost of equity and debt separately. But
the new ACC after additional financing cannot be determined
unless the effect of the financing decision on the firm is known.
Except then, when it is assumed that debt and equity capital
costs are in no way interdependent, cost formulas incorporating
neither considerations of leverage nor other risk factors are
alone of no real value in the approach to capital structure.
There has been discovered by this writer no authority who main-
tains a theory of complete independence between debt and equity
funding costs except where the amounts are insignificant and/or
the time periods short. Accordingly the question of separate










The preceding discussion strongly suggests that questions
of capital costs are inextricably bound up with concepts of
stock valuation. In fact, it is widely accepted that a corpora-
tion's cost of capital cannot be determined until an analysis is
made of how the market values the firm's common stock. Since
the accepted objective has been established as maximizing owners'
wealth, the optimal financing solution will be attacked from the
aspect of share valuation. Possible methods to be examined here
will build upon and add to the income streams identified in the
preceding section.
Mao considers four alternative valuation theories, reducing
2
'
them all to equivalent statements. He begins with a method
which exactly fits none of the four income streams already
mentioned. The method is termed by him The Investment Opportunities
Approach inasmuch as it" equates the value of a company's shares
to the present value of existing assets plus the present value
of future investment opportunities. The terms used m this
formulation are:
~E! = Constant annual earnings from existing assets
assumed to be received @ end of year t
b = The fraction of each year's earnings reinvested
Eugene M. Lerner and Willard T. Carleton, "The Integration
of Capital Budgeting and Stock Valuation," in Foundations for
Financial Management
,
ed. James Van Home (Homewood, 111. : Irwin,
1966).
2








at rate of return r per annum,
k = Rate of return required by investors, or
alternatively the cost of equiuy capital to
the firm (the costs of issuing new securities
are assumed to be zero). The term k is
identical in meaning to the term i used by
MM.




bE-j_ (1 + br) t - 1
(1 + k) t
r - k
k
) is expressed by
t = 1
Reinvestment in the year t (t = 1, 2.
the numerator of the first term and is
bE' (1 + br) t " 1
This model of valuation is compared by Mao with one developed by
MM and found to be at least implied by their model published in
an article "Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares,"
Journal of Business
, XXXIV (October, 1961), pp. 411-433.
Using the net earnings income stream, Mao develops a second








t = 1 (1 + k)
The term 1! is nothing more than the expression for reinvestment
in the year t, already given above as:
bEj_ (1 + hr) 1 ~ 1
The rationale for the model is that if a firm must undertake
additional investments to produce the projected earnings, the cost
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of these investments must be deducted from the current earnings
in the years when the investments are made.
A third model, The Stream of Dividends Approach , introduces
2
the new term D! -, . It represents the total amount of cash
~C ,1
dividends paid in year t on shares of record at the beginning of
year 1. With expectation of future cash dividends of D-! -, DA -, .
.
The current market value, V, of these shares is then:
-5Z -^
1
t = l (l + k) t
A simplifying assumption Introduced into the model is that there
is no outside financing, hence, cash dividends DI equals the
excess of earnings over investments,
V - V
The equation is immediately seen to be equivalent to that of the
earnings approach.
The fourth model, again using one of the classic income
streams listed on page 69 is The Discounted-Cash-Flow Approach .
With the assumptions made for all the models, this one is found
equivalent to the others.
Reviewing the four approaches is valuable, if at all,
because, it can be seen therefrom that with proper assumptions
they are all equivalent. They all rest upon the functional









required "by the investors, and the value of the company's shares."
With the cost of issuing new securities assumed to he zero, as
was the case, the rate of return required hy investors was equal
to the cost of equity capital to the firm. The four formulas
all give the same value if k is constant, a condition agreed upon
by most writers so long as conditions of certainty, rationality,
and perfect capital markets prevail. The disagreement, as over
MM's hypothesis, is whether cost of capital, k, is constant when
the three conditions do not hold.
In support of the theory that k is determined hy dividend
2policy, Eyron Gordon has presented some of the best known work.
The spectrum of contemporary controversy is reasonahly well
defined hy Wl at the extreme, considering the earnings stream as
all important; Gordon in the middle, leaning toward the dividend
hypothesis hut flexible; and Durand, the extreme supporter of the
dividend hypothesis. With the degree of controversy existing
over method, it is still seemingly reasonable to apply dividend
valuation methods to many firms whose current and probable future
policies include stable payouts. This being the case, the model
of Bierman and Smidt , adapted from Gordon's work, may be a
reasonable approximation for valuation of certain firms, where
debt is not employed. Cost of equity might then be likewise















the relative benefits to the owners that might be enjoyed through
debt leverage.
Interestingly, though, this formula does suggest the




o k - g
where
:
k = Cost of common stock
P = Current market price per share
D = Current dividend rate
o
g = Expected annual percentage rate of increase
in future dividends , expressed as a decimal
fraction.
Since all unknown factors are summarized in the term g, it would
presumably be possible to reconcile this simple model with
almost any other, MM's included, by appropriate assumptions as
to how leverage and retained earnings affect the investor's
determination of g.
Dividend Policy Effect on Valuation
In the preceding presentation of valuation formulas, the
Investment-Opportunities Approach took into consideration
reinvestment of earnings. A somewhat more exhaustive treatment
of the reinvestment effect upon valuation is given by KM, based
upon work by Gordon. Preliminary to a study of formulas, the
Bierman and Smidt , op. cit .
, pp. 14-6-150.




general considerations in dividend policy are
77
1
1. Dividends are foregone to increase the present
value of future dividends, out the time pattern
is shifted thereby. Since near future dividends
are less risky than those expected farther in
the future, the distant dividends may he more
heavily discounted by investors.
2. With imperfect markets as in reality, stockholders
cannot always reinvest dividends at the rate of
return on equity due both to brokers ' fees and
individual tax.
3. Differential tax rates between capital gains and
straight income may affect investors' preference.
4-. The raising or lowering of dividends may affect
stockholders' opinion of how management views
future prospects. It is presumed by EM that
investors favor retention when they preceive that
the investment opportunities are sufficiently
profitable.
5. It is likely that not all investors agree upon
the risk class and prospects of the company. (This
was the first assumption underlying MM's argument „)
With these considerations in mind, a representative firm is















t - (1 - b) xt
D. = The dividend paid to shares in existence at
time zero
b = The proportion of earnings retained (constant)
X, = The actual income total in any future period t
x







1 + rb >
where
:
r = The return to new investment (constant)
then:
X. = X (1 + rb)* = X erbt
t o v y o
The value of the firm in year zero, V
,
can then be written
as the present value of all future dividends, discounted at a
constant rate k (required rate of return on equity) or:
r n -kt
u vV. = J D^e ^°dt
since
D. = (1 - b) X erbt
t v J o




V = f (1 - b) X erbVktdt
If k is greater than rb (required rate of return to equity greater
than the growth rate), integration will yield:
(1 - b) X^
V_ =
o k - rb
If V is known, k can be determined as:
o '
(1 - b) X






d = The current dividend yield
While the foregoing model is impressive for its simplicity
and ability to provide k by employing current, rather than
expected values of r, b and X
,
, it has a strong weakness. Still
the development of the expression is a helpful insight to the
factors of dividend policy. If differentiated with respect to b,
the resulting expression
dV X f , >,o o (r - k)
db k - rb
reveals that where r is less than k, all earnings should be paid
out. Conversely, where r exceeds k, the firm can expand infinitely
at only the cost k for new stock. Its weakness is that r, the
rate of return to investment, is not likely to remain constant
with infinite investment. To be realistic, the functional rate
of change of r with increasing investment need be known.
The Effect of Corporate Income Tax
Most writers on the subject of capital structure theories
eventually include consideration of tax. This factor has already
been introduced in Chapter II as a determinant of capital
structure. Gordon, Solomon, Lintner, and Mao, to name a few, all
cover this analysis. Because RM's treatment is simple, yet
2










X = Expected yearly income "before tax and interest
Xpp = The firm's expected yearly income after taxes
"but including interest payments
T - Tax rate
L = Market value of debt
p = The rate at which investors value the after-tax
earnings (l-T)Xofan unlevered firm
i = Interest rate
i, = The rate at which investors capitalize the sum
TiL
For an unlevered firm,
X
T
= (1 - T) X









= (1 - T) X + TiL
The iL factor arises because interest is deductible from earnings
as an expense, thus that portion is not taxed. The term TiL may
then be thought of as a rebate, in the form of lower effective
interest costs to stockholders of levered firms. The after-tax
value of the unlevered firm will be:
v (1 - T) YV
T " p
For the levered firm the after-tax value will be:
.
(1 - T) X TiL
T po H
.
RM reason that fluctuations in TiL will be subject to the same
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risk, if any, of the interest payments and i, therefore, should
normally equate to i™. The value of the levered firm after tax
then "becomes
:
The implication is that the after-tax cost of capital p, = X, /V,
declines with leverage.. Furthermore, since debt increases the
after-tax value of the firm, its use would always seem preferable
to equity. Carried to the limit, this preference would cause
firms to approach an all-debt capital structure. The fact that
all firms do not even use debt leads one to consider the Wi
proposition suspect. The reasons why firms may not do so were
discussed in Chapters II and III. With the existence of corporate
tax and the apparent soundness of the previous analysis by RM,
it seems practical to undertake fund source selection as though
an optimal capital structure were assumed to exist
Approaches to Capital Structure Under
Conditions Approximating Reality
It will be recalled that all the models and approaches dis-
cussed thus far have been constrained by assumptions effectively
limiting their use. This study will follow the method of RM in
relaxing the limiting assumptions in an effort to gain a general
approach to the optimal finance question. Such an attempt
naturally implies that the MM propositions are rejected here, as
indeed they are, principally on the basis of the existence of tax.
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EM suggest as a starting point the following valuation
model: &© co
-YZ^i ,1-p t t
t = 1 II (1 + iO t = 1 II (1 + Tr)
It is in the general form of the stream of dividends model of Mao
on page r/ l\. The terms are defined as follows:
P = Market price of a common share
D, = Expected dividend per share in year t
i~, = Discount rate expected to prevail during period V*;
equates to the essentially riskless rate of interest
expected to prevail, for instance, government bonds
IT (1 + i^) = Denotes the product (l + ~£ ) (1 + ip) (1 + i, )
Normal discount (1 + i) is not used because the
rate ly* is not constant.
a. = A factor such the risk averting investor is
-t
indifferent between D, and a dividend D* = a, D,
t t —t t
which is certain to be paid. - a , - 1 This
factor is termed a certainty equivalent and
was discussed in Chapter III.
The equation involves certain conclusions. It conforms to the
discounted present value method. It considers expected dividends
as the appropriate basis for establishing stock value. It embodies
the certainty equivalent approach to uncertainty, and it applies
only to an individual shareholder's expectations and attitudes
toward risk. At this point the equation involves no conclusions
Though EM defines a, as above ,. it seems more logical to
define it as < a, ^ 1 as it is impossible to conceive of a risk
averting investor being satisfied with a dividend of times D^.
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regarding the relation between financial leverage and value. In
order to generalize the equation further, EM introduce the time
preference factor, IP
,
representing the degree to v/hich the firm's
dividend policy is optimal to the investor . If, for instance, the
policy was 80 per cent pay out when the investor purchased the
stock, its dividend policy may have been optimal to investor X
and I, ~ !• Future plans to Invest through retained earnings may
promise to decrease pay out to 60 per cent, a policy not optimal
to Mr. X even if share value increases somewhat or later dividends
increase. The term If, then is reduced in value. The equation
becomes: &s
p t—t t
t~i fi (l + T )
T=. i
By redefining D, to be the expected dividend if investors' current
expectations of future inflation turn, out to be exactly correct,
the factor of inflation is considered. EM provide some
theoretical methods for incorporating inflation effect but they
2
will not be presented here.
Having developed the above valuation expression, EM propose
a practical application for financing decisions. By means of
testing a range of financing strategies in a simulation-heuristic
procedure, EM seek to discover the one strategy maximizing the
value of stock through maximization of the expected return to
common shares. The leverage problem is then handled external to









the valuation formula above "by means of its effect upon T7, . Their
procedure is staged, and for the long-term financing decision
proceeds as follows:
Stage I
1. Select a time period and planning horizon.
2. Specify certain preliminary financing alternatives,
such as a tentative dividend policy.
3. Project the cash flows under the assumption that
the investment decisions are given.
4. As with Donaldson's approach to debt capacity,
relationships between inventories and fixed
assets must be estimated, as must other similar
relationships affecting cash.
The outputs of this stage are the preliminary forecasts of
financial needs over time.
Stage II
It is at this point that the heuristic approach is introduced
through identification of alternative strategies available to
the firm. The strategies must specify:
1. The type of financing instrument to use, debt,
common stock, other
2. Timing of issues
3. Maturity of issues other than common






5. Possible revisions in dividend policy
The output of this stage should provide all the information con-
sistent with cost of acquiring it, which will assist in the final
selection of strategy. For instance, RM estimate a market price
for common in ten years for each of the several strategies under
review. This estimate is derived from multiplying projected
earnings by the price earnings ratio assumed. Though they
acknowledge the naivete of this procedure, no specific remedy is
suggested other than "great care."
Stage III
Through use of the equation introduced on page 82, the
decision maker in this stage attempts to evaluate the differential
effect of the alternative strategies upon the value of the common
share. As a practical simplification, the equation is modified
to the form: 2
t
10 a.D. a P-.~
__^
—
—t t v 10
t = 1 (1 + lj (l + l)
The number 10 is the arbitrarily chosen time horizon of ten years.
The selection of a time horizon makes necessary the forecast of
market value at the end of that time horizon, hence the second
term. The factor )fl is dropped, though, as mentioned earlier,
RM suggest means of incorporating this factor. The denominator
(in both terms) is now the compound factor of constant discount




In this form, the valuation conforms to the third concept






can "be used if any basis exists for varying the discount rate
with. time. Values of a, must be estimated (as must the current
certainty equivalent factor). EM suggest two out of infinitely
many ways this might "be done. Having determined a "by comparison
"between appropriate corporate securities and payments from
government securities, a, might he estimated to decline either
linearly or exponentially as:






The value for a was defined as a-,,-, implying that the certainty
equivalent factor for the forecasted end-of-horizon market value
is relatively less than the factor for the forecasted dividend in
that year.
Using the methods described above, P may be determined for
each strategy in each "of the years out to the time horizon and
for values of a varying in accordance with any function. The
highest values for P then indicate the desired strategy. Note,
however, that the solution in this case is not uniquely optimal.
Instead, the values of P simply indicate the impact of changes
in the certainty equivalent factor upon common share value for
each strategy. It is conceivable that different certainty
equivalent factors should be applied to the various strategies.




RM do not identify the source of the variable, b. In their
example it is given values from .01 to .10 in .01 increments. It




Accordingly, the system for evaluating a could be modified, with,
resulting relative changes in P .
The method described is simply one example of a simulation-
heuristic technique. For all its complexity and variety of
assumptions, the method is systematic. EM argue that with
current computer ability and existing simulation techniques for
developing the basic information input, the heuristic approach
based on that information offers a rational approximation to the
optimal solution for fund sources. The approach of Donaldson
to evaluation of cash flows described in Chapter III exemplifies
one method of generating the Stage II information. EM state that
their personal experience with the Monte-Carlo method offers a
totally different avenue to the optimal solution, but with
greater programming complexity.
A second general, or all-inclusive model for share valuation,
and hence capital cost,, has been developed by Eeisman, Weston, and
2Buffa. Their method involves a system of thirteen equations
whose simultaneous solution determines the optimum mix of internal
equity, outside equity, and debt.
Because of its general nature, the system can accommodate
any of the specific assumptions or constraints presented by other
writers as uncovered by this study. Because of the factors con-
sidered therein the originators refer to their system as the
Eobichek and Myers, op. cit .
,
p. 153*
2Arnold Eeisman, Fred J. Weston, and Elwood S. Buffa,
Toward a Theory of Optimum Financing Mix (Los Angeles, Calif.:
Western Management Science Institute ,. UCLA, 1964), pp. 1-5*
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PRADIENTX model. The letters of the acronym represent:
P - Price of a share of equity
R - Revenue
A - Assets
D - Dividend rate
I - Interest rate on debt
E - Rate at which expenses are generated (excluding D,
I, and T)
N - Number of shares
T - Tax rate
X - Earnings/share
Uncertainty is not incorporated into the basic model but could
2be employed without dirficulty. The uncertainty equivalent
factor as used by RM or Lutz and Lutz would be one method of
allowing for this. The complexity of the system precludes its
comparison with that of RM. It seems, however, that with consis-
tent input, the results would be compatible. This presumption is
based on the apparently conventional forms of the equations.
Reisman, Weston, arid Buffa do not contribute to the conceptual
understanding of the optimal financing problem, but they do add
an approach to its approximate solution.
Summary
The traditional approach to capital structure postulates










where the overall cost of capital to the firm is minimized. Using
"basically traditional concepts from Schwartz and RM, a method of
determining the optimum mix of debt and equity is developed "by
means of indifference patterns and a relationship expressing





The MM propositions are contrary to the traditional concept.
They hold that the real cost of debt, after accounting for the
attendant increase in equity cost, is the same as the cost of
equity, and that the marginal cost of capital to a firm is equal
to its average cost of capital. By means of an arbitrage tech-
nique, MM demonstrate .that no two claims to expected future cash
receipts, with identical risks, can sell at prices which cause
the expected rates of return on the two claims to differ. MM
assume that no tax exists.
Barges ' s challenge to the MM propositions was discussed
from both the theoretical and empirical aspects. Though suggesting
a rejection of them, Barges does not conclusively disprove the
MM propositions. The analysis of RM was then reviewed beginning
with emphasis upon the disagreement concerning underlying assump-
tions. RM demonstrate that the MD curve of Figure 5, in order
to exist as shown, requires that the marginal rate of interest
must be greater than the yield to equity. This unlikely condition
places Proposition II in question.
As a concluding element on the discussion of MM's work, their
assumed income stream was compared v/ith other income streams
common in finance literature.
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The cost of capital was discussed briefly. It was determined
that, for purposes of this paper, the significant aspect of
capital cost is the marginal change in cost occasioned by the
financing decision. Due to the interdependence of debt and equity
costs revealed by previously mentioned material, averaging the
separate costs determined by formulas for debt or equity is not
the most useful technique for solving the capital source selection
problem.
The selection of capital sources was then approached from
the standpoint of the decision's effect upon common share value.
Several models proposed by Mao were evaluated. They all were
found to depend upon the functional relationship of: forecast
probability, the rate of return required by the investors, and
the value of the company's shares. Furthermore, they were all
discovered to produce identical values where k (cost of equity
capital) is constant.
.
Dividend policy and its effect upon k were analyzed briefly
but sufficiently to conclude that there is little agreement
within finance literature on this relationship. The effect of
dividend policy upon valuation of common shares was then studied
using a hypothetical firm assumed to finance its investment
solely from retained earnings. This model, based upon Gordon,
was found to be useful but weak in that it assumed a constant
internal rate of return, r. A situation where r remains constant
with increasing investment is considered unlikely.
A basic assumption of MM is the absence of tax. Using the
method of RM it was shown that the value of a levered firm is
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greater "by a factor TiL/i, than an equivalent unlevered firm,
both in a tax environment. Based on this demonstration, the MM
propositions are rejected here and some form of the traditional
concept concluded to prevail.
Having found all of the models and approaches investigated
to be constrained by apparently unrealistic assumptions, an
alternative technique from EM was analyzed and found to be useful.
The method involves the use of a relationship where the market
price of a common share, P
,
is expressed in terms of: expected
dividends per share, discount rate expected (interest rate on
riskless securities), and a certainty equivalent. The effect of
financial risk arising from leverage is accounted for by appro-
priate application of probabilities to the projections for expected
cash flows. Dividend policy is similarly accommodated by adjusted
cash flow projections. The repetitive solution for valuation,
using different financing strategies and their attendant cash
flows leads to the optimum strategy. The solution, while not
uniquely optimal, can conceivably approach the optimal through use
of computerized methods to simulate enough strategies and test
for the sensitivity of variables.
A final consideration was given to a method by Reisman,
Weston, and Buffa which utilizes a system of simultaneous equations
This method, like others discussed earlier, could be employed




It was the primary goal of this study to identify those
factors which should be considered in determining the capital
source for investment. As a preliminary step, the alternative
sources were studied in Chapter II to determine their inherent
nature and their limitations. Chapter III then reviewed the
arguments of financial theorists and practitioners regarding the
factors suggested. In Chapter IV, the quantifiable aspects were
analyzed in a mathematical manner to determine their roles and
significance. The following factors are concluded to be
significant to the selection of fund sources:
A. The objectives, of the firm . Based on the positions
of recognized authorities as well as upon intuitive reasoning, an
objective of maximizing the wealth of the residual owners (common
stockholders) was established as the foundation of conceptual
solutions to the problems. Without such a unifying principle,
the process of selection is aimless.
B. Risk . Risk was demonstrated to be a factor in the
rational investors' determinations of required yield. This factor
as introduced by both the nature of the firm (industrial, utility,




to "be the single most potent determinant of capital cost. Even
if FiM's argument for arbitrage were fully accepted, the role of
business risk in determining fund source and cost would remain as
the existence of homogeneous risk classes has not been conclusively
proven.
C. Stability of earnings . The determination of this
factor as significant was closely related to the study of business
risk, the latter being a measure of earnings stability of the
industry. It was shown that both the range and distributions of
earnings are critical factors in the selection of fund sources.
Empirical evidence supported the theoretical conclusion that
firms with inherently stable earnings can better utilize debt




D. Reguls bion . This factor was established in recognition
of the role played by ..government control over franchised
monopolies.
E. Stage in the life cycle . New firms have no recourse
but to build an equity base before they can attract debt capital
under acceptable conditions. Similarly, older firms, having
reached a practical limit of debt as far as creditors are con-
sidered, may be forced to expand their equity. It was shown also
that a firm with limited investment opportunities might sustain
its small fund needs through internally generated funds. The
stage of the life cycle then controls the availability and the
relative attractiveness of alternative sources.
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F. Debt capacity . Given the objective of owner wealth
maximization, it was demonstrated, through use of Gordon Donaldson's
method, that the prudent manager will limit debt to remain within
safe limits. Furthermore, a prudent manager will control the use
of debt even though lenders may be willing to provide more debt
on favorable terms. His assessment of risk, though not necessarily
so rationally arrived at as in Donaldson's example, will keep
financial risk within some arbitrarily determined corporate
standards. It might be inferred from the study that if management
did not do so, enlightened lenders would soon increase the
tangible and intangible cost of debt beyond attractive limits.
G. Money and capital markets . The fact was established
that the availability of funds in the market affect their
selection. A current example used in illustration was the exist-
ing paucity of debt capital forcing large corporations to plan
new equity issues.
Subsidiary question (a) . How should the cost of additional
capital be determined? Implicit in this question is the
evaluation of relative fund source costs. It was discovered
during this study that attempts at individual computation of debt
costs and equity costs are not the most useful way to approach
the problem due to the interdependence of the costs upon each
other. The following general method of solution is concluded to
be of practical utility:
(a) Determine the current market value of a common share.
(b) Select a tentative fund source (or fund source
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strategy) and time horizon and determine the value of a common
share at that time, using a valuation formula and/or technique.
(c) Since all formulas and methods for share valuation
reviewed in this study incorporate a factor for equity capital
cost, the difference between the share values in (a) and (b) may
be set equal to the valuation formula and the marginal or incre-
mental cost of equity determined.
(d) Steps (b) and (c) may use any of a number of formulas,
such as those of Mao, supra
,
pages 72 through 7^? so long as the
assumptions of the formulas reasonably apply to the firm in
question and so long as a factor is added for terminal value at
the time horizon. Neither the formulas of Mao nor that of KM
explicitly include the effect of leverage. This must be accounted
for by projecting future cash flows in a manner similar to that
described by KM, allowing for risk and uncertainty by certainty
equivalent factors or other probability methods. Dividend
policies which are to be varied over time may also be accommodated
by the cash-flow-simulation technique.
(e) With the effect of debt and retained earnings properly
accounted for in the assessment of cash flows, no explicit com-
putation of debt cost need be made; its effect will be included
as an imputed cost in the marginal cost of equity capital.
(f) The process of steps (c) and (d) must be repeated for
each source alternative or strategy to determine the minimum
marginal cost.
Subsidiary question (b) . What are the effects of dividend
policy upon capital structure? It is concluded, that for a given
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firm with a given investment program, dependence upon external
funding varies directly, though not necessarily linearly, with
pay out ratio. No general conclusion can be reached regarding
dividend policy's effect upon the market; value of capital
structure inasmuch as it was demonstrated in the study that both
expected dividend pay out alone or expected growth alone can,
under certain circumstances, lead to increased common share
valuation. It is further concluded that meaningful statistical
study is required to determine how investors evaluate dividend
policy in determining required equity yields.
Subsidiary question (c) . Is there a definable relationship
between capital structure and capital cost ? In the absence of
corporate tax, the evidence for or against a definable relation-
ship is considered inconclusive. With the existence of a sub-
stantial corporate tax on earnings , it j s concluded that the use
of debt, in moderation, can reduce the cost of capital to a firm.
However, no reliable relationship was discovered defining a unique
optimal structure even in the presence of tax. From this con-
clusion, it follows that cost should be included under the
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